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An Unconventional Challenge to Apartheid: The Ivorian Dialogue 
Diplomacy with South Africa, 1960–1978 
 
By Abou B. Bamba 
Gettysburg College (abamba@gettysburg.edu) 
 
In early September 1975, a Johannesburg newspaper broke the news that an Ivorian 
delegation led by Laurent Dona Fologo (Minister of Information) was about to start a 
twelve-day visit to South Africa. The planned trip was the culmination of a dialogue 
diplomacy that Ivory Coast initiated in the late 1960s and was a clear departure from the 
isolation policy that African states were trying to implement so as to pressure the apartheid 
regime in Pretoria. Even though the visit had been arranged by a black South African, the 
Ivorian scheme was bound to stir controversy. Indeed, the very news of sending a 
“Dialogue mission” to South Africa led President Marien Ngouabi of the Congo to dismiss 
the initiative as a “grotesque masquerade.” Other African opinion-makers echoed 
Ngouabi’s rejection, including Paul Bernetel—an influential columnist at the Paris-based 
weekly Jeune Afrique—who found the trip ill timed.1  
African public opinion in reaction to the Ivorian mission was largely hostile and 
dismissive, deriding the visit as an act of acquiescence and even betrayal. I argue in this 
article that a critical look at the Fologo mission and the larger Ivorian stance can shed new 
light on the complex transnational politics used to fight apartheid. First, unlike the claim 
that the Ivorian policy-makers acted on the prodding of the French, I suggest that Ivory 
Coast’s dialogue initiative was primarily a Pan-Africanist extension of the home-grown 
practice of “Dialogue à l’ivoirienne.”2 Moreover, by sending a multiracial delegation to 
South Africa, the Ivorian authorities genuinely attempted to undermine apartheid, in that 
                                                
1 Patrick Laurence, “Fologo Arrives on a ‘Mission of Peace,’” Rand Daily Mail [Johannesburg], 11 
September 1975; “Dialogue: ‘Ivorian Weapon,’” West Africa [London], 29 September 1975; Paul Bernetel, 
“Un voyage inopportun,” Jeune Afrique [Paris], 19 September 1975. Reportedly it was Professor Winifred 
M. Kgware who arranged for the visit. For details, see Patrick Laurence, “‘I Talked Fologo into It,’ Says 
Prof,” Rand Daily Mail, 9 September 1975. It is equally plausible that the Ivorian president and Johannes B. 
Vorster had discussed that trip during their secret meeting of Yamoussoukro in September 1974. For details, 
see Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, 3rd ed. (Pretoria: Department of Information, 1976), 
871–72. 
2 On the history and workings of “Dialogue à l’ivoirienne,” see W. Joseph Campbell, The Emergent 
Independent Press in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire: From Voice of the State to Advocate of Democracy (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1998), 78–81; Lanciné Sylla, “La dynamique de la reconciliation et de la prevention des conflits 
en Côte d’Ivoire,” Africa [São Paulo] 20–21 (1997–1998), 9–26; Michael Cohen, Urban Policy and Political 
Conflict in Africa: A Study of the Ivory Coast (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 115–44; 
Jeanne M. Toungara, “The Apotheosis of Côte d’Ivoire’s Nana Houphouët-Boigny,” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 28, 1 (1990), 34–35. 
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they took inspiration from the transnational politics that led to desegregation in the United 
States. Thus, focusing on the period between 1960 when a distinctive African voice in the 
anti-apartheid movement emerged and 1978 when the Ivorian authorities backed down 
from their public call for dialogue with South Africa, the article recounts the vicissitudes of 
an activist, if misunderstood, diplomacy. 
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the man who sent Fologo and his delegation to Pretoria, 
was not a newcomer to Pan-African diplomacy.3 In fact, his political career had long been 
marked by the desire to secure a place of leadership for himself and for his country in 
Francophone West Africa’s regional politics. During the heyday of decolonization he 
spearheaded the creation of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), a 
particularly vocal trans-territorial nationalist political organization in French West Africa.4 
Although he was eclipsed somewhat later on by younger and more militant West African 
politicians, the statesman (whom many referred to as Le Vieux or Wise Old Man) had, by 
the 1970s, succeeded in establishing a regional hegemony in the framework of relatively 
loose inter-state organizations within Francophone West Africa.5 Houphouët-Boigny’s 
diplomatic initiatives toward the rest of Africa, including South Africa, were meant to 
further this leadership role steeped in an inflated deployment of dialogue. To achieve his 
rather narrowly defined goal, the Ivorian president adopted flexible strategies that shifted 
according to the particular junctures of African politics. Although the old statesman had 
backed the militant Pan-African coalition against apartheid in the early 1960s, he had by 
the 1970s come to favor a policy of negotiation and dialogue, which he claimed did “not 
necessarily lead to political recognition of the South African regime.”6 What prompted 
such a volte-face in Houphouët-Boigny? What was the nature of the proposed dialogue 
diplomacy? How did Le Vieux’s peers and the larger African public opinion receive the 
plan? Within the dual context of a radicalization of the worldwide anti-apartheid 
movement and the increasing paranoia of the Afrikaner ruling elite in South Africa, was 
the plan viable at all? 
In examining these questions I have come to see the Houphouëtian diplomacy of 
dialogue as a failure. I do so not only on the evidence that the Ivorian leader was unable to 
                                                
3 For an insightful biography of Houphouët-Boigny’s life, see Fréderic Grah Mel, Félix Houphouët-
Boigny, 3 vols. (Abidjan/Paris: Editions du CERAP/Maisonneuve & Larose/Karthala, 2003–2010). See also 
Paul-Henri Siriex, Houphouët-Boigny: An African Statesman (Paris: NEA and Nathan, 1987). 
4 Elizabeth Schmidt, Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement 
in Guinea 1939–1958 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005); Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West 
Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization? (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2002); Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, 
Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). 
5 Virginia Thompson, West Africa’s Council of the Entente (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1972); Jacques Baulin, La politique africaine d’Houphouët-Boigny (Paris: Eurafor-Press, 1980). For an 
overview of Ivorian diplomacy under Houphouët-Boigny, see Marc A. Ziké, La politique étrangère de la 
Côte d’Ivoire (1959–1993): Une diplomatie au service de la paix et du développement (Abidjan: COPRECA 
Edition, 1994). 
6 “Vorster Hints He Will Establish Ties with Black African States,” New York Times, 6 November 
1970. 
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convince the South African government to trust black South Africans, but also on the 
observation that Ivorian diplomacy could not bring on board the influential members of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Pan-African intellectuals, the African press, and 
to a lesser degree, the transnational anti-apartheid movement. Given the timing of Le 
Vieux’s dialogue scheme and despite his much acclaimed “skills at persuasion and 
negotiation,” the Ivorian president could not persuade the OAU and the African anti-
apartheid coalition to espouse his ideas.7 This does not necessarily imply that Houphouët-
Boigny’s stance vis-à-vis apartheid was accommodationist; very much the opposite. As the 
examination of his September 1975 diplomatic maneuvers demonstrates, by sending a 
multiracial delegation led by Minister Laurent Dona Fologo (and his white wife—Danièle 
Fologo) to South Africa, the Ivorian leader did attempt to subvert the South African racist 
ideology even as he seemed to save Pretoria from the diplomatic isolation that both grass-
roots organizations and the international community deemed critical to the overthrow of 
apartheid.  
By focusing renewed attention to the modality of President Houphouët-Boigny’s 
engagement, I wish not to rehabilitate a man whose Machiavellian paternalism needs no 
further demonstration. However, I deem it necessary to complicate the assessment of his 
diplomatic ploys vis-à-vis apartheid.8 While a number of studies have explored the 
dialogue diplomacy, very few have seriously analyzed the tactics and arguments of the 
official Ivorian side in this episode of the anti-apartheid movement.9 In a certain sense, 
revisiting this chapter in the diplomacy against apartheid will challenge the basic 
conclusion of an Ivorianist (and by extension, Africanist) historiography that still views 
anyone who ventured to propose a different philosophy of action regarding the South 
African question as a “sellout” or “lackey” of Western imperialism and neocolonialism.10 
                                                
7 For Le Vieux’s skills as a negotiator, see Toungara, “Apotheosis,” 51; Siriex, Houphouët-Boigny, 309. 
8 The literature on Houphouët-Boigny’s Machiavellian ploys is extensive. For a short list, see Samba 
Diarra, Les faux complots d’Houphouët-Boigny: Fracture dans le destin d’une nation (Paris: Karthala, 1997); 
Laurent Gbagbo, Côte d’Ivoire: Pour une alternative démocratique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1983); Marcel 
Amondji, Félix Houphouët et la Côte d’Ivoire: L’envers d’une légende (Paris: Karthala, 1984).  
9 Roger Pfister, Apartheid South Africa and African States: From Pariah to Middle Power, 1961–1994 
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005), 48–76; Sifiso M. Ndlovu, “The ANC’s Diplomacy and 
International Relations,” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol. 2, 1970–1980, ed. SADET Trust 
(Pretoria: University of South Africa, 2004), 615–67. There are some exceptions to this trend, but the couple 
of studies that have looked at the dialogue diplomacy from the Ivorian side usually fall short of analyzing Le 
Vieux’s actions as serious and potentially consequential diplomatic moves. For details, see Baulin, La 
politique africaine, 199–208; Daniel Bach, “L’insertion ivoirienne dans les rapports internationaux,” in Y.-A. 
Fauré and J.-P. Médard, eds., Etat et bourgeoisie en Côte d’Ivoire (Paris: Karthala, 1982), 110–12. Grah 
Mel’s latest installment on the life of the Ivorian statesman provides a more nuanced, if largely popular, 
account. For details, see Félix Houphouët-Boigny, vol. 3: La fin et la suite (Abidjan/Paris: Editions du 
CERAP/Karthala, 2010), 101–31. Finally, there is one first-hand account of this episode of the dialogue 
diplomacy from an Ivorian perspective. For details, see Gaoussou Kamissoko, De Yamoussoukro à Pretoria: 
Le chemin du dialogue (Abidjan: NEA, 1985). 
10 A prime example of this historiographical school is Pierre Nandjui, Houphouët-Boigny: L’homme de 
la France en Afrique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995). See also Gbagbo, Côte d’Ivoire, 168–70. Revealingly, the 
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To portray the likes of Houphouët-Boigny as puppets of Western interests is to subscribe 
to a historiographical tradition that sees Africans only as powerless, with little agency. I 
argue that it might serve Ivorianist scholars well to rethink such views, especially when 
some of the supposedly all powerful Western actors have suggested that in many instances 
it was the Ivorian leader who manipulated his European peers.11  
Tracking the Routes of a Dialogue Diplomacy 
The story of the Ivorian call for dialogue with Pretoria confirms Pierre Kipré’s laconic 
observation that Houphouët-Boigny’s engagement with apartheid South Africa can be best 
described as “ambiguous.”12 Before independence, Ivorian authorities had been quite 
critical of the apartheid regime. In July 1959, Fraternité (mouthpiece of Le Vieux’s party) 
had labeled the South African regime a “short-sighted government” which used an 
“indefensible racial principle” that has “worn out the patience of the Africans.”13 In the 
years following Ivory Coast’s independence, Le Vieux and his lieutenants joined the Pan-
African chorus in denouncing apartheid, which they described as an “anachronistic” 
system.14 In this vein, Arsène Usher Assouan, the Ivorian ambassador to the United 
Nations in the 1960s, violently criticized both Portuguese and South African leaders who 
had come to “lock themselves” in a historical time that most people had left behind. As a 
consequence, Assouan continued, the victims of Portuguese and South African rule were 
forced to envision “war or subversion” as the only possibility for emancipation. However, 
in a move that prefigured things to come, the Ivorian diplomat concluded that Africa 
needed peace—a concept that neither the Portuguese nor the white South Africans seemed 
to understand.15 In subsequent years, a web of domestic events and regional geopolitical 
entanglements would force Houphouët-Boigny to focus on the consolidation of the Council 
of the Entente and to tighten his grip on power within Ivory Coast.  
It was in this crucible that dialogue emerged as a privileged, if self-serving, means 
of political communication. This context is important because it allows us to see that the 
origins of Le Vieux’s dialogue diplomacy were beyond the seeming dependency of Ivory 
Coast on France. In fact, if there is any single root of the diplomatic posture, it is to be 
found in Houphouët-Boigny’s “style of rule” which, in the words of Jeanne Toungara, was 
                                                                                                                                              
members of the scholarly school seem to reiterate the ideas of some of the historical actors without much 
critical distance. For details, see Ansoumane Bangoura, “L’imperialisme et ses agents,” Horoya (Conakry), 
11–17 July 1976; “Beware of the Tempter,” Sechaba (Dar es Salaam/London), January 1971. 
11 Jacques Foccart and Philippe Gaillard, Foccart parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, 2 vols. 
(Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995–1996). See also, Baulin, La politique africaine, 50–58; Felix O. Alalade, 
“President Felix Houphouët-Boigny, the Ivory Coast, and France,” Journal of African Studies 6, 3 (Autumn 
1979), 122–31. 
12 Pierre Kipré, Côte d’Ivoire: La formation d’un peuple (Paris: Sides-Ima, 2005), 218. 
13 “Troubles raciaux,” Fraternité (Abidjan), 3 July 1959. 
14 K.A.J., “Intolérable ségrégation,” Fraternité, 1 April 1960. 
15 “M. Usher stigmatise l’attitude du Portugal et de l’Afrique du Sud,” Abidjan Matin, 22 November 
1962. On the significance of the rhetoric of peace and dialogue in Ivorian diplomatic action, see Ziké, 
Politique étrangère, 99–102. 
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“greatly influenced by the application of traditional concepts in a modern context.”16 As 
we shall see, no other practice better typified this astute combination of the old and the 
new than the mobilization of the so-called “Dialogue à l’ivoirienne” as a political weapon.  
Dialogue—a neotraditional reactualization of the institution of the palaver tree—
had been used repeatedly in Ivory Coast since the late 1950s to diffuse and even settle 
social unrest and other political conflicts.17 In the aftermath of decolonization, it became 
the favorite tool of political communication of the Ivorian leadership. In times of crises 
such as those involving the alleged plots of 1963–1964 or the student unrest of 1967–1968, 
Houphouët-Boigny used dialogue in the form of mass meetings and face-to-face 
discussions to “legitimize his action while permitting some symbolic participation in the 
decision-making process.” 18  The legacy of these political moves may have proved 
problematic since dialogue only “strengthen[ed] the single-party state and expand[ed] its 
reach in society.”19 Yet in the context of the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s, it allowed 
Houphouët-Boigny to retain the reins of power. Given the relative success in mobilizing 
dialogue to manage politics within the Ivory Coast, it might have been tempting to 
implement the same technique to address Africa-wide problems, including the crisis that 
resulted from South Africa’s policy of racial segregation.20 
Since the first wave of decolonization on the continent, much of the African 
diplomacy against apartheid South Africa had been left in the hands of regional actors in 
Southern Africa and Pan-Africanists such as Kwame Nkrumah.21 By the late 1960s, 
however, Houphouët-Boigny was becoming less impressed by the policies carried out by 
his peers vis-à-vis Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies. In May 1967, he 
reportedly told the U.S. ambassador to Ivory Coast that all the African leaders could 
accomplish was to merely take “some platitudinous resolutions about Angola and Southern 
Africa, with no attention to realistic means of implementation.”22 Some months later 
Houphouët-Boigny reiterated his point claiming that, “African policies toward South 
Africa, Rhodesia, [and] Portuguese Africa are getting nowhere.” Then he concluded: the 
“only hope of progress lies in resuming dialogue” with the authorities of those 
countries/territories.23 Although it fed on the omnipotent “Dialogue à l’ivoirienne,” the 
Ivorian leader’s move was clearly a nod to the “Outward policy,” which South African 
                                                
16 Toungara, “Apotheosis,” 25. See Sylla, “Dynamique de la reconciliation,” 15. 
17 For this interpretation of dialogue as a form of neotraditionalism, see Sylla, “Dynamique de la 
reconciliation,” 13, and Campbell, Emergent Independent Press, 77. 
18 Cohen, Urban Policy and Political Conflict, 117. 
19 Campbell, Emergent Independent Press, 78. 
20 Grah Mel, Houphouët-Boigny, vol. 3, Fin et suite, 34, 106–107. 
21 Jeffrey S. Ahlman, “Road to Ghana: Nkrumah, Southern Africa and the Eclipse of a Decolonizing 
Africa,” Kronos 37, 1 (2011), 23–40. 
22 Abidjan to Department of State, 24 May 1967, Papers of George A. Morgan, Box 1, Lyndon B. 
Johnson Library (hereafter, LBJ Library), Austin, Texas. 
23 Abidjan to Department of State, 7 November 1967, Papers of George A. Morgan, Box 1, LBJ 
Library. 
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authorities embraced when Johannes B. Vorster assumed the Premiership in 1966.24 But 
domestic events compelled Houphouët-Boigny to focus again on Ivory Coast, even as he 
remained “determine[ed] to recognize and establish closer relations with South Africa.”25 
At the Fifth Congress of Ivory Coast’s ruling party (the Parti Démocratique de Côte 
d’Ivoire [PDCI]) in October 1970, Houphouët-Boigny turned this theoretical determination 
into practice when he publicly declared himself in favor of dialogue with the white 
minority government in Pretoria.26 Domestically, the Ivorian president had just survived 
yet another challenge to his authority by young technocrats who were demanding the 
expansion of the gerontocratic boundaries of the patrimonial state. Through cunning and 
the use of dialogue, the Ivorian statesman once again had overcome opposition to his 
mercurial rule. Past the storms of unrest, he could now devote his time to foreign policy, 
including the South African puzzle.27 Houphouët-Boigny’s resurgent activism found its 
first public manifestation in January 1971 at a gathering of Francophone African countries 
in Chad. Although the efforts at rallying his Francophone peers were not successful, the 
Ivorian leader did not concede defeat. Rather, he opted to shape international public 
opinion by organizing a press conference to which some 126 international journalists were 
invited.28 At that media event held on 28 April 1971, the man whom many observers 
considered a moderate affirmed: “I believe that dialogue with the Whites of South Africa is 
possible, especially if we locate it within the neutral framework of a peace through 
neutrality.” Such peace, Houphouët-Boigny argued, would be a “peace that involves all the 
Africans, both the Whites of South Africa as well as ourselves. White South Africans must 
overcome apartheid which is the sole cause of disunion between them and their black 
brothers of Africa.”29  
                                                
24 Pfister, Apartheid South Africa and African States, 39–104; Ndlovu, “ANC’s Diplomacy,” 616; 
Robert S. Jaster, The Defence of White Power (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989), 11. 
25 David Rockefeller to Henry Kissinger, 4 April 1969, White House Central Files, GEN CO 73, 
Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library (hereafter, RMN Library), Yorba Linda, California. For a quick 
overview of Le Vieux’s domestic difficulties, see Diarra, Faux complots, 65–97; Grah Mel, Houphouët-
Boigny, vol. 2, Epreuve du pouvoir, 277–304. 
26 Theodore Eliot to Henry Kissinger, 25 November 1970, National Security Files, Box 737: Ivory 
Coast, RMN Library; Kamissoko, De Yamoussoukro à Pretoria, 12; Nandjui, L’homme de la France, 204. 
See also, Grah Mel, Houphouët-Boigny, vol. 3, La fin et la suite, 106–107. 
27 Theodore Eliot to Henry Kissinger, 25 November 1970, National Security Files, Box 737: Ivory 
Coast, RMN Library. 
28 William Borders, “Vorster Bid Gets Support in Africa: Ivory Coast’s Leader Urges Black Nations to 
Join in Efforts for Closer Ties,” New York Times, 29 April 1971; Claude Lemelin, “Africa’s Chief 
Emphasizes ‘Dialogue,’” Washington Post, 29 April 1971; Daniel Bach, “Les initiatives franco-sud-
africaines de ‘dialogue’ avec l’Afrique francophone,” in Daniel Bach, ed., La France et l’Afrique du Sud: 
Histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains (Paris and Nairobi: Editions Karthala and CREDU, 1990), 211; 
Baulin, La politique africaine, 206. 
29 Kamissoko, De Yamoussoukro à Pretoria, 13. See also Nandjui, L’homme de la France, 204; Sam 
Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa: A Study of Ideology and Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1975), 274. 
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Arsène Usher Assouan, as Ivorian delegate to the OAU Ministerial Council, 
heartily defended this stance at the June 1971 meeting of the Pan-African organization. 
When the matter came to a vote, however, a too strong majority of the member-states of 
the union rejected his proposal.30 Nonetheless, the Ivorian president remained confident. 
He quietly sent Laurent Dona Fologo to sound out the American authorities on the issue of 
dialogue.31 More tellingly, an interview in Fraternité Matin showed that Houphouët-
Boigny had stubbornly decided to move ahead, for he vowed to intensify efforts to rally 
other like-minded African leaders and possibly to send a delegation to South Africa.32  
An Ivorian mission on a “private visit” did arrive in Pretoria in early October 1971. 
Reportedly, the head of the Ivorian delegation was even received by Premier Vorster.33 
The Pan-African outcry that ensued must have deterred other countries from associating 
themselves with Houphouët-Boigny’s diplomatic move. 34  By mid-1972 the Ivorian 
president had come to doubt any prospect of success for his attempt at a Pan-African 
mobilization for his dialogue diplomacy. The effects of this conjuncture are revealed 
obliquely in a letter of the French Chargé d’Affaires in Pretoria to the Quai d’Orsay. 
Reporting on an interview that Arsène Usher Assouan gave to Raymond Louw (editor of 
the Rand Daily Mail), the French diplomat noted:  
Mr. Assouan Usher seemingly told Mr. Louw that Ivory Coast still believes in the 
politics of dialogue, but that it must convince other African countries of its 
usefulness. The Ivory Coast will not act without the consent of these [African] 
countries. Thus any direct conversation between Ivory Coast and South Africa was 
premature.35 
But the Ivorian authorities were not conceding defeat on the issue of dialogue. In fact, they 
were ready to re-establish direct exchange with the South African government on the 
condition that South Africa officially declared that all men are created equal and publicly 
                                                
30 Gilbert Comte, “Remous autour du projet de dialogue avec Pretoria: Le Président Houphouët-Boigny 
aura du mal à rallier les Etats francophones à ses thèses,” Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), June 1971; “OAU 
Dissension as Emperor Pleads for Unity,” Guardian (Manchester), 16 June 1971; Colin Legum, “Ivory Coast 
Walks Out over Agenda: Objects to ‘Dialogue,’” Washington Post, 19 June 1971; “Black Africa Rejects 
‘Dialogue’ with S. Africa,” Washington Post, 24 June 1971; Bach, “Initiatives franco-sud-africaines,” 212. 
31 Jerry Warren to Ronald Ziegler, 8 October 1971, White House Central Files, (EX) CO 73, RMN 
Library. 
32 Félix Houphouët-Boigny (interview with Laurent D. Fologo), “Houphouët rompt le silence: ‘Nous 
enverrons une mission à Prétoria pour le dialogue,’” Fraternité Matin (Abidjan), 4 October 1971. Fraternité 
Matin replaced Fraternité in 1963 when the latter merged with Abidjan-Matin. 
33 Paul Hofmann, “Border Incidents Stall Vorster’s Bid for Talks,” New York Times, 8 October 1971; 
“Black Envoys Visit Pretoria,” New York Times, 7 October 1971; Ndlovu, “ANC’s Diplomacy,” 623–24; 
Bach, “L’insertion ivoirienne,” 111; Baulin, La politique africaine, 207; Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa, 
278. 
34 Ndlovu, “ANC’s Diplomacy,” 624. 
35 Chargé d’Affaires [Pretoria] to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 31 August 1972, Archives des 
postes/Abidjan, Carton 43, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques (hereafter, CAD), Nantes, France. 
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committed itself to the abolition of racial discrimination. Only then would a world 
conference be organized to promote reconciliation among South Africans.36  
Although the South African officials never complied with these demands, the 
Ivorian leader staged in 1973 a “world peace conference” in Abidjan where, according to 
one zealot of Houphouëtism, “more than 3,000 delegates gathered to listen to the apostle 
and militant of world peace.”37 Reportedly, the old statesman cautioned his disciples 
against using armed struggle to solve the South African question for “it is usually better to 
engage in dialogue than to dramatize.”38 If the aim of that media event was to sway the 
African opinion to the politics of dialogue, it seems to have had little impact. Thus 
Houphouët-Boigny had to wait until the mid-1970s to see the emergence of a new 
opportunity for his dialogue agenda. 
This prospect came in the form of the Carnation Revolution when, on 25 April 
1974, a group of army officers mounted a mutiny that led to the overthrow of the Caetano 
government in Portugal.39 The new political situation in Lisbon led to an alteration of the 
geopolitical balance of forces in Southern Africa. Portugal’s withdrawal from the region 
spelled the collapse of the South African “cordon sanitaire.” Aware of this disturbing 
prospect, the realist Vorster indulged in a series of meetings meant to resuscitate the 
détente plans that had been laid in 1967.40 Thus, in late 1974, the South African Premier 
became personally involved in the negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, 
whose white settlers had declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 in an 
attempt to shortcut black-led decolonization. In a similar move, he made surreptitious 
overtures to both the Frente de Liberacão de Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Zambian 
president, Kenneth Kaunda. 41  What a contemporary observer dubbed the “secret 
diplomacy of détente” was extended beyond southern Africa, since in September 1974 the 
Afrikaner Premier met with Houphouët-Boigny in his hometown of Yamoussoukro.42 
Though the military invasion of Angola by the apartheid forces would bring a halt to 
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Vorster’s diplomatic offensive, the seeds of discord within the African coalition against 
apartheid South Africa had been sown anew.  
Nothing testified more clearly to the re-emergence of jarring dissonances than the 
heated debate driving the February 1975 budgetary session of the OAU in Addis Ababa. 
The mood at that session was so electric that, in an effort to prevent the OAU from losing 
face, the Algerian Foreign Minister had to propose that a special session be called to deal 
with the question of détente with Vorster.43 When the date of the eagerly awaited meeting 
came, Houphouët-Boigny, through his envoy Assouan, quickly pressed for the adoption of 
a policy of dialogue with apartheid South Africa. With the signatories of the Lusaka 
Accords backing off, however, the future of dialogue was once again doomed. As Vorster 
recognized a week later, the member-states of the OAU “decided to close the door to 
détente and dialogue.”44 But the Ivory Coast authorities gave a radically different reading 
of the policy document that resulted from the meeting—the Dar es Salaam Declaration on 
Southern Africa. Indeed, in an article entitled “L’unique voie” (The Only Solution), the 
editor-in-chief of Fraternité Matin claimed that the OAU special session confirmed the 
legitimacy of dialogue. Then the editorialist concluded: 
They certainly are disappointed, those duplicitous champions of violence who sit in 
the comfort of their palaces and remain far removed from the war zones. They must 
be disheartened at reading the “Dar-es-Salaam Declaration” which recommends, 
just like the Lusaka Manifesto, to explore all the promise of dialogue with Vorster 
and Ian Smith rather than to use force.45  
Even if language is polysemic, nothing was so removed from the spirit of the Dar es 
Salaam resolution. In fact, not only did the text reject the kind of détente that Vorster was 
advocating, but it also reiterated Africa’s “support to the national liberation movements of 
South Africa in their struggle in all its forms.”46 In hindsight, however, it appears that the 
Ivorian newsman was paving the way for the boldest act of his president’s politics of 
dialogue: the sending of an official delegation to South Africa in September 1975; a 
delegation led by none other than Fologo who was accompanied by his French wife. 
It is revealing, if ironic, that upon arrival at Jan Smuts Airport, Houphouët-
Boigny’s envoy told reporters that in the quest of peace through dialogue, “no sacrifice 
will be spared, not even sacrifice of self-respect.”47 While he never refused to socialize and 
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drink toasts with the Afrikaner ruling elite, Fologo made no bones about voicing his 
repulsion for apartheid South Africa, which he even called a “sick” society. He also lashed 
out at apartheid, calling it a “poison.”48 Given such a seemingly contradictory stance, 
many contemporaries wondered about the motivations prompting Houphouët-Boigny to 
send a delegation to apartheid South Africa. All the more so since rumors in certain liberal 
circles in South Africa suspected material benefits for the West African country. In fact, as 
early as 1973 they argued that Houphouët-Boigny’s dialogue diplomacy was aimed at 
helping Ivory Coast fill out its “empty” hotel rooms with South African tourists. In other 
words, Ivorian calls for dialogue was informed by a desperate search for South African 
partners to salvage the economy of West African country.49 
In response to these rumors and other accusations, Fologo made the following 
statement as soon as he reached Johannesburg: “Our country is not even looking for 
investment. We already have investors.”50 Although South Africa was Ivory Coast’s fifth 
largest trading partner—a fact that Ivorian officials strove to hide from the international 
community—Fologo’s claim must not be dismissed altogether. 51  For, at the time 
Houphouët-Boigny was promoting a dialogue diplomacy with South Africa, the economy 
of Ivory Coast was on the road of success—prompting some analysts to dub the Ivorian 
experience an “economic miracle.”52 Macroeconomic indicators were so positive in the 
late 1960s and 1970s that some scholars even claimed that Houphouët-Boigny’s country 
had reached the status of semi-periphery in the global economy.53 Aware of this situation, 
political scientist and contemporary observer Sam Nolutshungu argued in 1975 that Ivory 
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Coast and its president could not be “accused of having a material interest in dialogue.”54 
Such observation was certainly perceptive.  
However, the lack or implausibility of a quest for material wealth as the motive 
behind Houphouët-Boigny’s dialogue initiative must not lead one to believe that there was 
no investment.55 The Ivorian leader was not so much interested in accumulating economic 
capital as he wanted to attract other forms of capital, including the social and the symbolic, 
that is, prestige and leadership.56 This becomes apparent when Nolutshungu suggested that 
Houphouët-Boigny’s ploys with regards to South Africa might have been a tactical 
maneuver in a larger “right-wing revolt” of some African countries, including among 
others the Ivory Coast, Tsiranana’s Malagasy Republic, and Busia’s Ghana. In this 
scenario, the actions of Houphouët-Boigny are cast as lending a helping hand to Tsiranana 
who lacked influence in African politics yet needed a normalization of relations with South 
Africa.57 Jacques Baulin, another observer/participant who, as erstwhile counselor of the 
Ivorian president, has further offered that Houphouët-Boigny’s initiatives stemmed from 
the coming together of three extremely important parameters in Ivorian political life: a 
narrow-minded nationalism, moderation with a whiff of anti-communism, and complicity 
with certain Parisian business circles.58 
Among these factors, the fear of a communist takeover of Africa was arguably 
paramount. Although Houphouët-Boigny and his friends of the Rassemblement 
Democratique Africain (RDA) had allied themselves with the French Communist Party in 
the early days of postwar nationalism in West Africa, such alliance subsequently proved to 
be a liability. Consequently, the RDA leadership disaffiliated their political movement 
from the French communists in 1951. Even more, Houphouët-Boigny became one of the 
staunchest anti-communist leaders in Francophone West Africa.59  
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Adding to this dread of communism, one can argue along with the New York Times 
that the fear of open war was a significant factor in the political thinking of Houphouët-
Boigny.60 Though little is known about the efficiency of the Ivorian Intelligence Service, it 
is likely that Houphouët-Boigny knew, in the Cold War context, that the “Cape route 
factor” played against the liberation movements in Southern Africa, all the more so since 
“OAU’s ability to provide financial aid to African liberation movements was limited.”61 
Terrified by the prospect of a replication of what he saw as the Palestinian Syndrome 
whereby subaltern groups came to lose the little they had due to both intransigence and the 
war-mongering counsel of “unreliable” friends, the Ivorian president received African 
National Congress leader Oliver Tambo and some of his close companions in December 
1972.62 According to diplomatic sources, Houphouët-Boigny told his South African guests 
that he was dubious about the efficacy of violence in bringing the Afrikaner ruling elite to 
reason: “Your means are weak not only at the plane of finance and armament but also at 
the level of military technique.” Even more, the Ivorian statesman pointed out that “the era 
when one would assess military might by the number of draftees is over.”63  
Perhaps Paul Bernetel—a prominent journalist at Jeune Afrique—had understood 
this rather cold realism that informed Houphouët-Boigny’s larger political philosophy. 
Although the columnist did not agree with the policy option of the Ivorian president, he 
nonetheless ended his 1975 cover article on Houphouët-Boigny with this advice: “I believe 
it wise for Africans as well as for the South African Liberation movements to dissociate 
Houphouët’s diagnosis from the cure he proposes.”64 These words fell on deaf ears; for the 
OAU, African intellectuals, and the Pan-African press seem to have all agreed to vilify the 
Ivorian leader for singing so different a tune in the choir to condemn apartheid.  
Responding to Houphouet-Boigny’s Dialogue Diplomacy 
The reception of Houphouët-Boigny’s diplomatic moves regarding the South African 
question in the early 1970s did not suffer from much opacity. In both the African and Pan-
African press, politicians, diplomats as well as intellectuals questioned the validity and the 
legitimacy of Le Vieux’s politics of dialogue. And this was ultimately conducive to and a 
reflection of the neutralization of Houphouëtism in the larger context of African 
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diplomacy. Houphouët-Boigny’s first public diplomatic initiative regarding the South 
African question caused outcries from many an African capital. Thus, as early as 1970 
when the Ivorian president made his announcement of planning to engage in dialogue with 
Vorster, Lagos criticized it as “unacceptable” while Conakry saw it as a “dishonor.”65  In 
the same vein, at the 1971 session of OAU Ministerial Council, the Congolese Foreign 
Minister depicted the Ivory Coast as a “by-product of French imperialism in Africa.”66 
Four years later, commenting on the presence of the Fologo delegation, Steve Biko’s South 
African Student Organization (SASO) slammed Ivory Coast for “flirting with people who 
were not interested in peace or dialogue, but were only gulling the world into accepting 
their racist policy.”67  
Yet it is in the print media that Houphouët-Boigny’s politics of dialogue received 
its harshest criticism. Indeed, in the form of a trope that posited the Ivorian president as a 
willing stooge working along the lines set by Western imperialists, Houphouët-Boigny and 
his country emerged in the 1970s as the target par excellence of both the underground 
press and the major Africanist newsgroups. Beginning in 1971, the South African 
underground newspaper Sechaba (official organ of the African National Congress) lashed 
out at the “Fort Hares and Turfloops, the Matanzimas, Banda and Houphouet-Boignes 
…[as] agents of colonialism […] offering their services as Bantu Commissioners in the 
political structure of the racist regime.”68 In early 1975 while Houphouët-Boigny was 
laying the groundwork for sending of his South Africa delegation, another black South 
African underground newspaper denounced the leaders of numerous moderate African 
countries who had “again raised the nauseating slogan of ‘dialogue’ with the racist South 
African regime.”69  
Though moderate in tone, Pan-African newspapers as diverse as West Africa and 
Jeune Afrique shared a similar view. In 1975, for instance, while the Fologo mission was 
still in South Africa, the Paris-based newsmagazine dismissed the trip of the Ivorians as 
“inopportune.” Then it continued, “It is dangerous to award Pretoria a degree of 
respectability without serious protest.”70 Laurent Dona Fologo, a trained journalist, did not 
wait long to vent his displeasure. No sooner did he get back from the ill-fated trip than he 
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replied to Jeune Afrique. 71  In an article entitled “I Am Back from South Africa,” 
Houphouët-Boigny’s emissary voiced his repulsion at what he qualified as “hypocritical 
editorials.” Then he concluded: 
Our immediate interest is peace. Our short-term interest is peace. Our long-term 
interest is peace. For us in Ivory Coast any time is an opportune time for peace. 
Our mission is not to mislead African opinion but to accept the unrewarding and 
dreaded task (in a climate of perpetual suspicion and hostility from our brothers) to 
tear down frontiers in the realms of fear, racism and hatred so that peace and justice 
may triumph on the African soil.72  
The last word in the media brawl known as “Dialogue on Dialogue” came from the editor-
in-chief of Jeune Afrique, who attacked Houphouët-Boigny’s dialogue initiative on the 
grounds that “the liberation movements in South Africa that are […] the first to be 
concerned, and the majority of the continent’s countries, are hostile to the ‘dialogue’ 
policy.”73 Judged from the standpoint of media reception, Houphouët-Boigny’s politics of 
dialogue reinforced his diplomatic failure to win over his fellow African leaders.  
A number of elements explain such failure. First, by the time the 1960s drew to a 
close, as one keen observer has stressed, revolutionary ideas had come to permeate the 
intellectual and cultural space of many African countries. 74  In fact, it is no mere 
coincidence that the late 1960s and early 1970s were also the heyday of the late Frantz 
Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Kwame Nkrumah, Steve Biko and their critical theories on 
colonialism, neocolonialism, national liberation, and black consciousness.75 Second, the 
presence of French expatriates in Ivorian bureaucracy was increasingly perceived as 
having a dominant influence in the late 1960s and 1970s.76 As an American diplomat 
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articulated it later, wedding the knowledge of such perception to the closer economic ties 
between Ivory Coast and France, on the one hand, and France’s military-business ties with 
South Africa, many observers came to view Ivorian foreign policy as a hostage to French 
interests.77 In other words, given the close relationship between Paris and Abidjan, any 
action on the part of the Ivorian authorities became synonymous with lackeyism. It is in 
this light that one can make sense of the dismissal of Houphouët-Boigny’s South African 
diplomacy by some of his peers. In a similar context, one can understand why U.S. Vice-
President Hubert Humphrey had, as early as 1968, advised President Lyndon Johnson that 
the United States should avoid “over-identification” with the Ivorian leader lest 
Houphouët-Boigny meet the “same problems he faces because of his heavy reliance on 
France.” Rather, Humphrey suggested that “quietly, and with only occasional publicity, we 
encourage the Ivory Coast to continue its leadership” in African matters, including the 
anti-apartheid struggle.78  
Thus radicalization of the anti-apartheid movement collaterally forced such a great 
power as the United States to maintain a low profile. By dismissing Houphouët-Boigny’s 
initiatives, however, anti-apartheid activists as well as revolutionary scholars have 
overlooked the subtlety of the weapon that Houphouët-Boigny attempted to deploy against 
the South African regime. In so doing, they may have left unfinished their attempts to 
understand the various modes of action to subvert apartheid. 
The Fologo Mission as Political Performance 
Before we examine the subversive edge of the Fologo mission, it is appropriate to relate an 
incident that involved yet another proponent of dialogue with apartheid South Africa. In 
late 1971, Malawian President Kamuzu Banda visited South Africa, and in his honor, the 
Vorster government organized a reception. Reportedly, at that dinner, the Afrikaner Prime 
Minister sat between two black Malawian ladies. This caused outcries and concerns among 
diehard Afrikaner nationalists who had come to believe that “the inevitable social contacts 
with black diplomats would be subversive of apartheid.” They were so repulsed by the 
idea that the seemingly outrageous picture appeared in every edition of Die Afrikaner for 
many months.79 Whether the Ivorian delegation knew about this incident is not clear, 
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although Houphouët-Boigny approved of Banda’s visit and even sent a letter to 
congratulate the Malawian leader for his courage in meeting with the South African 
authorities.80 What is beyond doubt is that the very presence of the Fologos was intended 
to transgress such apartheid laws as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act or the 
Immorality Act. The editorialist of the Ivorian daily newspaper Fraternité Matin made that 
point quite explicit when he argued that Mr. and Mrs. Fologo were the “first mixed couple 
to be admitted together [into South Africa] in violation of the ‘Immorality’ Act.”81 
Foreign correspondents of wire services in Johannesburg did not lose sight of this 
transgression either. They underlined that the South African government was deliberately 
“ignoring the violation of its Immorality Act by the Information Minister of the Ivory 
Coast here on an official visit with his white wife.” Then the journalists explained: “The 
Immorality Act bans mixed marriages or any other close relationship between blacks and 
whites.”82 In a similar vein, the local Rand Daily Mail, in breaking the news that a mission 
from a black African country was coming to South Africa, added conspicuously that the 
head of the delegation would be “accompanied by his French wife.”83 Two days later the 
images of the couple were ostensibly displayed as if to say that apartheid was a hoax.84 
Furthermore, Fologo himself did not hide his dream of a multiracial South Africa. During a 
visit to the University of the North in Sovenga, for instance, the Ivorian emissary 
reportedly affirmed: “My wife is White, my friend is a Coloured and I am Black. We are 
trying to get together. This is what we wish to see in this country.”85 Bridging the gap 
between Fologo’s wish of a multiracial society and the coming of a rainbow South Africa 
may have had a long way to go. Still the race-based composition of the delegation he 
headed—four blacks, one white, and one métis—was a deliberate act of transgression 
meant to destabilize, in the view of an Ivorian editorialist, one of the tenets of the apartheid 
system: the myth of racial purity and white (male) supremacy.86  
Despite its fair coverage of the Fologo mission, the liberal Rand Daily Mail does 
not tell us the reaction of the ruling Afrikaner elite vis-à-vis the mixed nature of the Ivorian 
delegation. It seems, however, that Houphouët-Boigny was attempting to create cracks in 
the apartheid regime as a prelude to the eventual massive assaults he dreamed of when 
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African countries flooded Pretoria with Black diplomats.87 Anti-Houphouët scholar Pierre 
Nandjui has dismissed this attempt at a “pacifist invasion” of South Africa as a misguided 
strategy.88 But a comparative look at the historiography on desegregation in the United 
States in the 1960s suggests that Nandjui as well as radical African leaders in the 1970s 
may have ignored the power of a transnational historical process that proved so crucial in 
shaking the confidence of “apartheid’s reluctant uncle,” that is Jim Crow America. Such 
power, as many historians have demonstrated, resided in the unintended consequence of 
the presence of diplomats of color in the United States in the era of mid-twentieth century 
decolonization.89 
President Houphouët-Boigny was attentive to these transnational developments in 
the fight for desegregation in the United States and he attempted to replicate them in South 
Africa. An indication of this was revealed in 1971 when he called for the posting of 
African diplomats to Pretoria. During an interview with a journalist to clarify his position, 
Houphouët-Boigny rhetorically posed: “Don’t you think that the presence of foreign blacks 
in the US, in all the sectors, was helpful and conducive to solving this problem [of 
segregation] and leading to effective equality?”90 Attention to the behind-the-scenes 
decision making regarding Houphouët-Boigny’s purported non-violent assault on apartheid 
further confirms that the Ivorian leader knew how potentially disruptive and influential the 
presence of diplomats and dignitaries could be on the domestic events of any given 
country. Indeed, Gaoussou Kamissoko, a member of the delegation to South Africa, claims 
that Houphouët-Boigny’s appointment of Fologo rather than the Ivorian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs was mainly due to the fact that Danièle Fologo, the wife of the Minister of 
Information, was white.91 Thus while Houphouët-Boigny’s foray into the South African 
entanglement was graphed on a philosophy meant to forestall drama, the collateral 
consequence of his choice to send a racialized delegation to Pretoria was doubly dramatic: 
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not only did it violate the Afrikaner legislation against mixed marriages but, as we shall 
see, it more subversively assaulted the sexist subconscious of South African race relations. 
The interplay of race, gender, and sexuality have had a rather long and tormented 
history in South Africa. Miscegenation was tolerated and even looked at with some degree 
of amusement in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.92 By the early twentieth 
century, however, hysteria over the “threatening” libidinal drive of black males had raised 
concerns in white communities for their female members. By mid-century the hysteria 
known as the “black peril” had evolved into a major campaign issue which both the 
National Party and the United Party tried to mobilize for their benefit.93 Beyond electoral 
politics though, the debate over “black peril” offers a window into the sexist culture that 
informed race relations in South Africa throughout the apartheid era. That is because the 
obsession-driven debate indexed not only the subaltern status of white women who were 
posited as “weak” and “defenseless” objects to be protected against oversexualized black 
males, but it also echoed attempts at controlling their sexuality. When the attempt failed, 
ostracism was the ultimate sanction.94 
Danièle Fologo may have sensed the ordeal that this control and the implicit threat 
of marginalization entailed for women. In response to a question on Women’s Liberation 
by an interviewer during her stay in South Africa, she lamented that “in almost every 
country women are behind, the degree [of their subaltern status] depending on the 
[particular] country, but there is almost nowhere they are equal.”95 Earlier on in the same 
interview, Mrs. Fologo confided that she had anticipated that her trip “would be difficult 
because we are a mixed couple, and I know this is not in the framework of South Africa.”96 
Indeed, as Pierre van den Berghe put it, an “increasing stigma [had come to be] attached to 
miscegenation in South Africa over the years.”97 Worse still, such stigma was not 
restricted only to South Africans as evidenced by the conviction of aliens on charge of 
violation of the Immorality Act.98 Yet, what was even further beyond the framework of 
apartheid—which Danièle Fologo politely avoided to name, was that she, as a white 
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woman, could trample on the sanctity of sex across the color line and not the other way 
round. Mrs Fologo, and for that matter Houphouët-Boigny who sent her along with her 
husband, may have not been knowledgeable in the particulars of South Africa’s sexist past. 
Such lack of awareness, however, did not diminish the potential collateral power of her 
presence among the members of the Fologo delegation to South Africa. 
It is clear that such potentially subversive power did not mean much to the 
opponents of dialogue diplomacy. Within the context of the ever more radicalized anti-
apartheid movement, Houphouët-Boigny ultimately failed to rally people around his 
agenda as demonstrated by the outcry against the Fologo mission. Although the Ivory 
Coast appeared as “something of a maverick in the OAU,” as U.S. Ambassador Robert 
Smith assessed in 1976, it nonetheless drew “sharp criticism for its policy of increasing 
‘dialogue’ with South Africa.” Despite the Africa-wide condemnation, Houphouët-Boigny 
showed “no intention of abandoning ‘dialogue.’” To the contrary, he anticipated giving 
“landing rights” to South African airlines and “if the Angolan crisis defused,” Ivory Coast 
might establish “consular or even diplomatic relations” with Pretoria.99 Domestic events in 
South Africa and the heightening of the police state by a besieged apartheid regime, 
however, forced the authorities in Abidjan to reconsider their plans. 
Burying the Dream of Dialogue? 
Any attempt to understand how Houphouët-Boigny came to retreat from the dialogue 
scheme must take stock of the fact that the official position of Ivory Coast regarding the 
Afrikaner regime vacillated over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. Although much of the 
latter decade saw Ivorian diplomats calling for dialogue, as we have seen, it is worth 
remembering that in the early postcolonial period, especially with the creation of the OAU 
in 1963, Houphouët-Boigny had approved of the formation of a systematic and coordinated 
anti-apartheid coalition of African countries. The first strategy of such coalition was to 
pressure the UN into taking decisive actions against the minority regimes in Southern 
Africa. These actions ultimately put pressure on the UN General Assembly in 1967 to set 
up both a Special Committee on Apartheid and a Unit on Apartheid. By 1966, however, 
the OAU had started to lose confidence in the efficacy of this tactic. As one analyst offered 
in the mid-1970s, it had “become obvious that the United Nations would not be the 
machinery for the liberation of any of the territories in Southern Africa.”100 
The OAU did not rely solely on the niceties of diplomacy. In an era where 
revolution was in the air, many “Founding Fathers” of the organization could not but 
subscribe to a radical strategy of liberation. This found its embodiment in the 
establishment of the Liberation Committee and a Special Fund to help finance the different 
wars of liberation throughout Southern Africa. But the committee failed to provide 
sufficient financial resources to carry out a liberation war. Such failure doomed recourse to 
armed struggle as a viable method to bring about change, especially in South Africa whose 
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liberation movements received just a fraction of an already dwindled fund.101 The military 
inferiority of the anti-apartheid liberation movements was worsened by the fact that some 
French firms had kept providing the South African government with armaments while the 
British government, through the Simonstown Accords, maintained joint maneuvers with 
and military assistance to the South African Defense Forces (SADF).102 In a similar move, 
the Nixon Administration, following the recommendations of the National Security Study 
Memorandum 39, resumed selling aircraft and other military equipment banned under the 
terms of the UN arms embargo.103  
Given his knowledge of these developments, there is cause to believe that 
Houphouët-Boigny genuinely feared that guerrilla warfare in South Africa would lead to a 
Palestinian-like tragedy.104 Yet by citing the military weakness of the South African 
freedom fighters to justify his call for dialogue, the Ivorian statesman underestimated the 
ability of the black majority to regain their agency in the domestic fight against apartheid. 
In fact, even as Vorster seemed to control domestic events with the establishment of a 
police state through intimidation, banishment, imprisonment, and/or the sending of 
hundreds of veteran anti-apartheid activists into exile, the youth in black South Africa 
never gave up. Tellingly, as Vorster steadily consolidated his grip on power, young South 
Africans in the townships—many of whom had joined Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness 
movement—were becoming ever more radical in their defiance of the apartheid system.105 
This became manifest in mid-June 1976, when thousands of students took to the streets to 
denounce a new ordinance that required using Afrikaans as medium of education in black 
schools. The response of the South African authorities to such public display of defiance 
was as brutal as it was revealing of the desperate search for means to contain what turned 
out to be the fiercest popular challenge to Vorster’s rule. Confronted with the 
determination of the youth, the security forces fired on the protesters killing many, 
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including primary school students. The ensuing Soweto Uprising shook not only apartheid, 
but the entire world which had kept its eyes on the dramatic events.106 
The reaction of the Ivorian leadership was subdued, at best. Unlike much of the 
continent, the official press coverage in Ivory Coast was almost non-existent. Moreover, 
although Houphouët-Boigny condemned the Soweto shootings themselves, he remained 
adamant on the necessity of dialogue between the white regime and its black opponents.107 
Even more perplexing, Laurent Dona Fologo argued in an editorial in Fratenité Matin that 
the tragedy of Soweto happened because South Africans (both Blacks and Whites) did not 
practice the culture of dialogue. Houphouët-Boigny’s right-hand-man continued suggesting 
that given the revolting shootings of Soweto, it was tempting to call for the use of military 
force as advocated by some Pan-Africanist activists. But Fologo concluded that his country 
would not follow the “wolves and war mongers” since the Ivorian people remained certain 
that “dialogue and negotiation” were the only solution to solve the South African 
imbroglio.108  While the Ivorian government persisted in the belief that international 
dialogue with South Africa would pave the way for domestic dialogue between Blacks and 
Whites, it was clear to many contemporary African observers that things would not be the 
same after Soweto.109 
Soweto did change the power equation in apartheid South Africa. But even more 
damaging for the international standing of Pretoria was the police detention that led to the 
death of Steve Biko in October 1977.110 Sensing a radicalization of the police state in 
South Africa, Houphouët-Boigny revised his diplomatic response to apartheid. Thus, 
although he and his minister for Foreign Affairs had continued to meet secretly with the 
South African authorities, Ivory Coast decided to harden its stance against Pretoria. While 
the Ivorian statesman never discarded his “fundamental distrust of Communism,” by early 
1978 he was increasingly expectant that the United States would pressure the South 
African government.111 By mid-year, a spokesperson for Houphouët-Boigny disclosed 
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unsurprisingly that the dialogue approach was “not producing significant change in South 
Africa’s apartheid policies.” If the Ivorian leadership had embarked on the dialogue 
scheme, it was with the hope that “the South African Whites would understand the need 
for change. […] But it seems that they did not understand.” In fact, the Vorster government 
reportedly told the Ivorian authorities that, “they cannot make changes without facing a 
revolution.” In other words, Vorster proved to be unwilling to commit genuinely because 
he feared that engagement in any real domestic dialogue process was tantamount to 
opening a Pandora’s Box.112 In the early 1970s, as he justified his call for engagement with 
the Afrikaner regime, Houphouët-Boigny had promised that “If tomorrow the Dialogue 
policy that we are initiating with South Africa turns out to be inoperative and without 
effect on apartheid, we will be compelled to accept that they [opponents to Dialogue] were 
right and honestly we will revise our position.” It seems that Houphouët-Boigny kept his 
words on this promise.113 
Conclusion 
On the whole, it is true that in the long run there emerged other instances whereby 
Houphouët-Boigny became personally involved in South Africa’s inter-race negotiations 
and the eventual dismantling of apartheid. 114  However, few of these subsequent 
involvements matched the boldness of Houphouët-Boigny’s initiatives in the late 1960s 
and 1970s. At a time when Africa was discarding its final colonial yokes in bloody 
liberation wars throughout the Portuguese African colonies and radical grass-roots 
movements as well as the Organization of African Unity were stepping up pressure to 
isolate apartheid South Africa, Houphouët-Boigny decided to single himself out through a 
seemingly conservative approach towards the regime of so-called separate development. 
He not only proposed to engage in dialogue with the Afrikaner regime but also promised to 
convince other African countries to do likewise. Although the intended dialogue 
diplomacy was meant to break down apartheid, it ultimately proved ill-timed. This was so 
because Houphouët-Boigny failed to take stock of the intellectual atmosphere within the 
OAU and the larger anti-apartheid movement. In an era when revolutionary ideas were in 
vogue and thinkers/activists such as Fanon, Cabral, Nkrumah, and Biko were ascendant, 
any initiative to carve out a non-revolutionary space for diplomatic action was hopeless. 
This was especially so in the case of Houphouët-Boigny’s dialogue diplomacy towards 
apartheid South Africa that involved convincing people who were still grappling with the 
memory of their own racialized colonial pasts. In intellectual and political circles, the 
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course of dialogue became readily identified with collusion or acquiescence to 
neocolonialism. 
Re-examination of the strategies mobilized by a so-called agent of imperialism 
suggests, however, that Houphouët-Boigny acted “without prodding” in his initiatives 
within the OAU on specific problems.115 As we have seen, the seeming about-face of the 
Ivorian statesman and his subsequent embrace of an alternative to revolutionary diplomacy 
stemmed from a domestic political practice in which “Dialogue à l’ivoirienne” was 
deployed to manage contentious politics. Started during the late colonial period, such a 
neotraditional form of political communication had become in the 1970s a religion of sort 
that the old statesman repeatedly mobilized in an effort to reassert control over volatile 
situations.116 In this light, Ivorian policy toward Southern Africa demonstrated that Ivory 
Coast’s adherence to dialogue was “anything but servile.” Rather, the use of dialogue by 
the Ivorian authorities “reflect[ed] the belief that Ivory Coast, while still vulnerable, [was] 
increasingly in control of its own destiny.”117  
There is even room to see a subversive edge in Houphouët-Boigny’s maneuvers as 
revealed by the racial composition of the delegation he sent to Pretoria in 1975. As 
demonstrated in this essay, the scheme of sending such a delegation suggests that the 
Ivorian leader had a keen awareness of the paradox of international policy-making since he 
compared his maneuvers to the transnational politics of desegregation in the United States. 
Although overlooked at the time, the Fologo mission also proved to be an unintended 
subtle spoof on the gendered civility of the apartheid system. To some extent, then, the 
various of Houphouët-Boigny’s postures with regard to South Africa echo Leela Gandhi’s 
exegesis of “colonial mimicry.” Re-appropriating her ideas in the international context of 
anti-apartheid politics, one can claim that the engagement of Le Vieux with South Africa 
was an “ambivalent mixture of deference and disobedience.”118 
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